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From The Editor…
Listen to Ben Franklin
An explosion, a burst of media coverage, promises of swift justice and exacting punishment. Then comes the reactionary legislation. 
In the aftermath of July 17th terrorist attack, the 
Indonesian government has prepared to sacrifice civil 
liberties in the name of counterterrorism. Under current 
law, suspects may be held for only seven days without 
charges. The Yudhoyono government is now proposing 
to allow suspected terrorists to be detained without 
charges for two years. Other proposed measures include 
re-opening the anti-terror desk in the Indonesian 
military, and increasing the role of the special forces 
(Kopassus) in fighting terrorism.
Such reactionary lawmaking is common among states 
faced with the threat of terrorism. Over the past 
ten years, a remarkably clear pattern has emerged in 
Indonesia, the United States, Australia, and elsewhere. 
First, after a major attack, governments are under 
pressure to appear strong in the face of public fear. 
Second, in order to provide the appearance of security 
for its citizens, states invoke ill-conceived laws that 
expand the power of law enforcement with little thought 
given to the consequences. Third, after the initial panic 
subsides, the public comes to regret the far-reaching 
consequences of reactionary legislation.
In the United States the attacks of September 11th, 2001 
gave rise to a plethora of reactionary laws and policy; the 
Patriot Act that included warrant-less wiretapping, the 
creation of a legal black hole in Guantanamo Bay, where 
prisoners were classified as ‘enemy combatants’ and left 
without recourse to legal proceedings, and the ‘torture 
memos,’ a series of documents produced by the Justice 
Department that classified waterboarding and other 
forms of torture as permissible interrogation techniques.
Following the first Bali bombings, Australia too passed 
counterterrorism legislation that has become very 
controversial. The 2005 Antiterrorism Act included a 
‘shoot-to-kill’ clause that has been criticized and opposed 
by Australian civil rights organizations as well as many 
in the government and judiciary. The same is true for 
Australia’s policies that allow suspect’s detention without 
charges for two weeks. 
Proponents of such laws argue that exceptional 
circumstances demand exceptional legislation. 
The classic example of this is the Roman senate’s 
appointment of a dictator to protect the republic under 
extraordinary threat. There is no guarantee, however, 
that the dictator will relinquish his power even once that 
the threat has subsided. The disregard for democratic 
principles like the rule of law may pose as great a threat 
to democracy as terrorism itself. The costs of these 
exceptions outweigh any benefits.  
Proponents of reactionary legislation ignore the 
unintended consequences of granting the state broad 
powers to detain its citizens. The government may brand 
any opponent a suspected terrorist. The suspect is then 
imprisoned without any contact with his family and 
without basic legal rights. As the Indonesian National 
Human Rights Commission argues, such a policy is 
fundamental violation of an individual’s human rights.
The Indonesian government’s proposed policy of two 
year detention is similar to—and undoubtedly modeled 
after— that of Singapore and Malaysia.  In Malaysia, 
dozens of suspected Jemaah Islamiyah members are 
currently being held alongside human rights activists, 
journalists and bloggers.  This detention period may be 
extended in two year increments indefinitely, meaning 
that individuals may be held without charges ever being 
filed. 
Reactionary laws may actually damage the fight against 
terrorism by giving the Indonesian government a 
reputation of not upholding the rule of the law: the very 
principle it is purportedly defending against terrorism. 
In doing, Indonesia may be repeating the mistakes of the 
United States, which is only now beginning to recover 
from the harm to its reputation caused by the actions 
and policies created in the aftermath of September 11th.
Such damage to the United States’ public image 
has assuredly helped terrorists’ recruitment efforts. 
Because while locking up terror suspects prevents those 
individuals from committing act of terror themselves,  it 
does not prevent others from taking up the cause. Nor 
does it prevent imprisoned terrorists from maintaining 
their influence in the organizations. Currently some 
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members of Jemaah Islamiyah imprisoned in Indonesia 
are able to hold court with their followers in their prison 
cell, safe from prosecution because they are already 
under lock and key. 
Fighting terror is not as easy as throwing away that key. 
Democracy is endangered not only by terror attacks, but 
by the anti-terror legislation passed in their aftermath. 
As Benjamin Franklin’s said, “Those who would give 
up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary 
Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”  President 
Yudhoyono must remember Franklin’s wisdom by 
resisting the temptation to use counterterrorism to 
expand the role of military in domestic affairs, and avoid 
passing laws that turn back the progress made during 
Reformasi. p
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As of 14 September, there were 1097 confirmed cases of the H1N1 virus 
spreading over 25 of Indonesia’s 33 provinces.  Most are concentrated in the 
greater Jakarta area, and 10 deaths have been linked to the virus. Cases of the 
virus, popularly—but inaccurately— known as swine flu, are on the rise, and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) has declared it a pandemic, which 
by definition means it is unstoppable. 
Now that H1N1 is in Indonesia, certain questions arise: How bad could it 
get? Whose responsibility is it to respond? And, are they ready?
Early on in the H1N1 influenza outbreak, Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari 
indicated that Indonesia would not be struck by the virus. She explained that 
Indonesia’s climate would protect it from H1N1, and that Indonesians were 
less susceptible to the virus than other populations. 
These claims were quickly proven to be nonsense. By mid July, the 
government had reported the first confirmed case of H1N1 in Indonesia 
and the first fatality was reported on 22 July.
The messages sent early on by the Health Minister may have lead to dangerous 
complacency among other ministries and the public. Estimates vary widely, but 
some scientists predict that between 10 percent and 30 percent of Indonesians 
will become infected with H1N1 in the first wave that reaches the country. 
Even if only 2-4 percent of those infected are hospitalized, the government 
may be overwhelmed by the need. And if millions of productive workers in 
their 20s and 30s fall ill, the repercussions will be felt far beyond the hospitals. 
There are a couple of factors unique to Indonesia that have the attention of 
health experts both here and abroad.
Indonesia was not hit by the first wave of H1N1, which was concentrated in 
the Americas. As the first wave dies off, the second wave is hitting tropical and 
southern countries.  For countries like Indonesia, whose rainy season is just a 
couple of months away, there is a fear that the common flu season may occur 
simultaneously with the coming of H1N1. The common flu, occurrences of 
which increase during rainy season, may lower the immunity of individuals 
who catch it, making them more susceptible to H1N1. Many feared this 
would be the case with the SARS virus, however, and those predications did 
not come to pass.
The second danger is that H1N1 may ‘recombine’ with H5N1 (avian flu) 
to produce a ‘superbug.’ Viruses are able to mutate either on their own or in 
Government well prepared, 
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combination with another virus. The tropics in general are increasingly being 
recognized as the zone where influenza mutations occur, as flu is active year-
round rather than only seasonally.  
Avian flu has not been fully contained in Indonesia, and continues to take 
victims. To date, there have been 141 cases and 115 deaths from avian flu in 
Indonesia. 
The possibility of a recombination of H1N1 and avian flu is remote, but 
the threat it poses is great. The potential danger lies in a recombination of 
the two: a virus as virulent as avian flu and as infectious as H1N1. Avian flu 
does not spread quickly, but has a high percentage of fatalities for those who 
do contract it. Over 80 percent of avian flu cases in Indonesia—and over 
60 percent worldwide—are fatal. H1N1 is incredibly infectious, but most 
individuals (around 90 percent) are able to recover without even a visit to 
the doctor.  
In order to track possible mutations, scientists monitor how the virus spreads 
among humans and animals and take samples of the virus to track its profile. 
Worldwide, there have been four cases of the H1N1 virus being transmitted 
from humans to pigs and poultry, including a case in Argentina where a 
turkey contracted H1N1. 
The Agriculture Ministry is monitoring pig farms in Indonesia for cases 
of H1N1, as it continues to monitor for avian flu.  To date, only one pig 
infected with H1N1 has been found in Indonesia, and it was imported from 
Singapore.  Surveillance, however, remains limited and many experts argue it 
would need to be increased substantially to be of real value.
Thus far, all cases of transmission in Indonesian have been human to human 
and, according to the Health Ministry and the WHO, the H1N1 virus 
has the same profile and has not mutated.  The Health Ministry, however, 
continues to make it difficult—though not impossible—for scientists to 
access samples of the virus. This policy was borne out of the Minister’s 
desire to see that countries that share samples would have a fair share of 
the vaccinations produced. Without such samples, however, surveillance is 
impossible.
The structures and systems set up in the wake of the avian flu outbreak may 
serve Indonesia well in the H1N1 pandemic. In particular, the Indonesian 
National Committee for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (Komnas FBPI) is working closely with the Health Ministry to 
respond to H1N1. According to one official, they are taking exactly the same 
steps as they did with avian flu. 
Government response
In Brief
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The Ministry of Health is charged with monitoring ports of entry, diagnosing 
cases, organizing health logistics—including stockpiles of Tamiflu— along 
with communication with the public.
As a result of avian flu, the government has also put together two phonebook-
sized Pandemic Preparedness Plans:  one for the health sector, and one for the 
non-health sectors.  Based on the level of outbreak, different plans will go into 
effect, culminating, if necessary, in the isolation of an area.
The Health Ministry has also undertaken two large scale simulations of flu 
outbreaks in 2008 in Bali and earlier this year in Makassar, as well as several 
smaller scale simulations. In addition, they have hosted workshops for 
business communities.
More minor steps under the Pandemic Preparedness Plan include allowing 
employees who are confirmed to have the virus to take a three day sick leave. 
Businesses leaders who attended the workshop have been instructed to tell 
their employees to stay home if they are sick.  
Steps like these may be effective for those who work in the formal economy, 
but for the two thirds of Indonesian who find employment in the informal 
sector, three days off work—and without pay—may prove too costly.
The structures and systems in place at the Health Ministry and Komnas FBPI 
illustrate a good level of preparedness, but that picture may be misleading. 
When it comes to a pandemic, the role of the non-health public sectors as 
well as private sectors becomes paramount. 
In Brief
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Given the necessary involvement of other ministries, many countries 
coordinate their response to the pandemic from the ministry that oversees 
domestic affairs.  For example, in the United States, the Department of 
Homeland Security coordinates the response from the relevant departments 
and agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services. 
In the Pandemic Preparedness Plan, much of the responsibility falls to the 
districts heads.  As yet no messages have been conveyed that they should 
make any preparations. And so while the Indonesian government has detailed 
plans to minimize the damage of the H1N1 pandemic, it must now get on to 
implementing those plans.
By eliminating predatory tax regimes in the provinces and districts, a new 
regional taxation bill (RU PDRD-Rancangan Undang Undang Pajak 
Daerah dan Retribusi Daerah) passed by the House of Representatives in 
August may encourage investment in the regions. The new law is an attempt 
to undo the damage created by the  plethora of local taxes and user charges 
that were issued by regional government following devolution of powers in 
2001. Many of these taxes and user charges were unrelated to the fiscal needs 
of the governments concerned, and were nothing more than a money grab.
The new law contains two major changes regarding taxes (pajak) and user 
charges (retribusi), the two types of regional taxation in Indonesia.
•	 Provincial	 governments	 are	 allowed	 to	 impose	 taxes	 on	
vehicle ownership and vehicle registration, fuel, groundwater 
and cigarettes. No other taxes can be issued by the provincial 
level any longer. Likewise, district governments are now limited 
to a specified list of 11 taxes that they can charge, ranging from 
swallows’ nests to street lightning. Finally, RU DPRD stipulates 
that district governments can impose a maximum of 30 different 
types of user charges, while the provincial level can no longer 
issue user charges. The old Regional Taxation Law No. 34/2000 
did not stipulate such limits.
•	 The	RU	PDRD	sets	minimum	and	maximum	rates	for	each	
type of tax. Previously both provincial and district governments 
were able to set tax rates as high as they wished.
The New Regional Taxation Law: 
an end to predatory taxation?*
*  This part of the brief was provided by Michael Buehler, Postdoctoral Fellow in Modern Southeast 
Asian Studies at Columbia University in New York. He can be reached at mb3120@columbia.edu.
In Brief
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Soon after the adoption of the new law, automotive distributors such as PT 
Astra International Tbk and PT Indomobil Sukses International Tbk, as 
well as automotive financing firms such as PT Adira Finance Tbk saw their 
shares decline significantly as investors feared that the new law could dampen 
demand for new cars, motorbikes and trucks due to higher tax rates for a 
second vehicle purchases. Likewise, cigarette producers were warning about 
a negative impact of the new law. The Indonesian Association of Cigarette 
Producers (GAPPRI) said that the RU PDRD would be an extra burden for 
the industry and most likely exacerbate the illegal production of cigarettes.
The law will dramatically rebalance powers of taxation between the central 
and regional governments. Legislation passed in 1997 specifically limited 
the number of taxes and levies that regional governments could impose, but 
this changed dramatically after the decentralization law of 2001 provided 
sub-national governments with the authority to introduce taxes and levies. 
Regional governments issued more than 6000 different taxes and levies from 
2001 until mid-2005 alone. Most of them targeted the primary sector, as is 
shown in Table 1. 
Regional governments claimed to issue new taxes and user charges because 
of a lack of fiscal capacity. Yet in practice there was no correlation between 
the numbers of regional taxes issued and expected per capita expenditure 
or revenue of a certain government unit. Most sub-national taxes and user 
charges were predatory in nature.  
The central government had insufficient powers to revoke such taxes. The 
previous law required regional governments to submit their newly established 
taxes and charges to the Ministry of Home Affairs for formal review within 
15 days. Some taxes and charges were indeed rejected on the grounds of harm 
to the regional economy. However, due to the low capacity of the Ministry of 
•	 The	 RU	 PDRD	 pays	 special	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 vehicle	
taxation. The annual vehicle tax has been increased from 1.5 % 
of a car’s resale value  to 2 percent for the first vehicle. Vehicle 
owners will have to pay an annual tax rate between 2-10% for 
any additional vehicle, including cars, motorbikes, trucks and 
boats, excluding cars for public transport. The level of the tax is 
calculated by the multiplication between the vehicles sale value 
and a coefficient that relates to the regions road conditions. 
•	 Regional	governments	can	impose	new	taxes	on	cigarettes,	
hotels, entertainment and advertising under the RU PDRD
Balance of power
Two new taxes are worth mentioning:
Table 1 
Authorised new taxes and charges by type, 
Fiscal year 2000-2001
Primary sector
Service sector
Distribution
Government 
administration
Others
41%
21%
12%
11%
District/
Municipality
4%
11%Secondary Sector
42%
20%
18%
11%
Province
9%
Source: Data collected by the Report
In Brief
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Home Affairs, it managed to review just over 40 percent of the new taxes and 
charges submitted. Many regional governments implemented the bulk of the 
new revenue instruments unilaterally and illegally. 
The newly adopted regional taxation law aims to put a stop to such excessive 
tax regimes by introducing a so-called ‘closed list’ that stipulates the type of 
taxes and levies that may be imposed by regional governments. Consequently, 
the 6000 double taxes, illegal duties and levies will be abolished. The new law 
allows the central government to punish regions violating the closed-list of 
taxes and levies. 
According to a Ministry of Finance spokesperson, the government wants to 
ensure that revenues from regional taxes and levies imposed under the new 
law will be used for the benefit of taxpayers. Therefore, the revised regional 
taxation law rules that revenues generated must be used to finance related 
activities. Vehicle tax proceeds, for example, will now be earmarked to develop 
and maintain roads. Likewise, at least 50 percent of revenue from cigarette tax 
will have to be allocated for healthcare services and facilities.
The success of these laudable earmarking mechanisms could be put in 
jeopardy, however, by endemic corruption within Indonesia’s bureaucracy. 
Recent investigations by the Corruption Eradication Commission have 
exposed widespread practices of arbitrary and predatory tax collection at the 
sub-national level. In a report published in January 2009, the Indonesian State 
Audit Agency pointed out that it is common practice among regional officials 
to divert tax revenues for personal use. 
Governors, district- and sub-district government heads seem to be the main 
beneficiaries of such practices, while the Ministry of Home Affairs is also 
alleged to have profited. In a report from February 2009, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission estimated the total amount of embezzled tax 
proceeds to have reached 1.3 trillion rupiah (1 billion USD) in 2005-2007 
alone. 
In short, while the revised regional taxation law will improve legal certainty 
for investors, it remains doubtful that the revenues generated will be used to 
the benefit of the Indonesian people. p
The price of progress: Tax bill introduces an earmarking 
mechanism for development spending
In Brief
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Special Feature:
As the public awaited the results of the April legislative elections, Indonesia’s top judicial bodies, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
deliberated and delivered separate — and different — decisions.  This issue’s 
special feature takes an in-depth look at the two courts.*
The Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi or MK) was established 
in 2003 to be the court of review for legislation. Its main tasks are, firstly, 
to determine whether laws are consistent with the Constitution – striking 
down those that are not – and, secondly to decide whether votes in elections 
have been counted properly.
This job might appear straightforward, but nothing could be further from 
the truth. Quite apart from difficult legal issues, virtually all disputes 
the MK hears have strong political dimensions and ramifications. When 
assessing whether national laws comply with the Constitution, the MK is 
often required, in effect, to pass judgment on matters of government policy. 
This can often include determining the content and scope of contested 
human rights. In election cases, through reallocation of seats, the MK can 
reconfigure the political constellation of national and regional parliaments.
The MK has proved itself to be Indonesia’s most professional judicial 
institution. Led for its first four years by the shrewd and formidable 
constitutional law scholar, Professor Jimly Assiddique, it has built a deserved 
reputation for being competent and reliable in its decision-making and its 
independence from government. Now with a new Chief Justice, Professor 
Muhammad Mahfud, all indications point towards the MK remaining a 
model for Indonesian judicial reform. 
The MK’s main limitation is that it only has the authority to rule on laws 
passed by the national parliament. It cannot hear cases regarding legislation 
passed by regional parliaments or regulations created by national or regional 
governments. Because of this gap in its authority, the MK has had to apply 
various ‘tempering techniques’ to make its decisions effective.
The MK’s legitimacy has often been called into question. MK judges are 
not elected, so opponents often point to a lack of democratic credentials to 
thwart the majority decisions of elected House of Representative members. 
Some claim also that the MK has inadequate resources, expertise and 
experience to stand in judgement on delicately-balanced economic and 
social policy choices.
Two at the top:  the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court*
* The following special feature was prepared by Simon Butt, senior lecturer at the University of 
Sydney. He can be reached at s.butt@usyd.edu.au.
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Critics have also attacked many of the MK’s rulings as weak, poorly-
reasoned or inconsistent with previous decisions. Although there is truth 
to some of these claims, most of the MK’s controversial rulings conceal 
carefully-considered and pragmatic compromises, many of which do not 
strictly following of the letter of the law. These compromises, the MK 
learnt from its very first case, are necessary to preserve its credibility and 
perhaps even for its very survival. The MK’s judges, many of whom are 
former politicians, are well accustomed to the gulf that often exists between 
what the law on paper requires and what will ‘stick’ in the cut and thrust of 
politics. 
The MK learnt early on that it needs to incorporate a measure of flexibility 
into its decision-making from its very first case. In 2002 parliament passed 
a new Electricity Law (20/2002) in response to conditions that were tied 
to the provision of financial assistance to Indonesia by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) following the financial crisis of 1997. The Law 
sought to break down state monopolies in the provision of electricity. 
Soon after the law’s passage, however, the MK was asked by a number of 
parties, including employees and former employees of Indonesia’s State 
Electricity Company, to assess whether the Electricity Law was consistent 
with Article 33 of the Constitution. Article 33 was inspired by leftist and 
nationalist ideals popular in the lead-up to the declaration of Indonesia’s 
independence. It requires that the economy be structured as a ‘common 
endeavour’ and that the state control natural resources and sectors which 
provide the necessities of life. 
The MK concluded that parliament’s attempt at breaking down state 
control over the electricity sector fell foul of Article 33. But rather than 
just invalidating the offending sections or parts of the law, the MK, perhaps 
over-enthusiastically, struck down the entire statute, claiming that it violated 
the ‘spirit’ of Article 33.
The decision was strongly criticised by members of the legislature and the 
executive. Criticisms included that the MK had insufficient expertise to 
make decisions about matters of economic policy; that nine judges lacked 
the democratic legitimacy to invalidate Acts of Parliament; that the MK 
had prevented the government from complying with IMF conditionalities 
without considering the consequences; and that privatisation was critical to 
ensuring Indonesia would have sufficient electricity to meet demand. 
The government’s response was swift and decisive. Within two months it 
issued a regulation which, in effect, reinstated the thrust of the invalidated 
An early lesson for the Constitutional Court : 
The Electricity Law case 
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Electricity Law, albeit in different legal form. Government regulations, 
usually drafted by government departments and then signed by the President, 
have less legal weight than a statute (a law passed by parliament). But they 
are still ‘law’, despite bypassing parliamentary scrutiny, and there are no 
enforced limits as to what regulations can cover, provided that their content 
is consistent with ‘higher’ laws, such as a statute or the Constitution. 
Because the content of the regulation is similar to the content of the 
Electricity Law, it is likely that the regulation also breaches Article 33 of 
the Constitution.  But the Court has no power to investigate government 
regulations – its powers are limited to assessing statutes. Only the Supreme 
Court (Mahkamah Agung or MA) can review government regulations, but 
then only for compliance with statutes, not the Constitution. In any event, 
the Supreme Court has shown itself to be reluctant to strike them down. In 
short, the Constitutional Court can do nothing about the regulation, even 
though the regulation stands as a blatant derogation of its authority.
 This case exposed two large holes in the design of the Constitutional Court 
and was a lesson for the judges that they had to exercise caution in the 
application of their authority. The MK lacks jurisdiction over the bulk of 
Indonesian law contained in executive-level regulations and it has no power 
to enforce its decisions against the government. 
Similar shortcomings are faced also by constitutional courts in other 
countries, but many governments tend to comply as a matter of respect 
for the separation of powers and the judiciary. This case showed that in 
Indonesia, however, politicians were hostile to having their decisions (as 
reflected in their laws) scrutinised, let alone invalidated; and that the 
government would ignore MK rulings if doing so suited its purposes. 
From the earliest days of its existence, then, it was clear that the MK needed to 
find ways to make its decisions more politically palatable. If the MK failed to 
accommodate the environment in which it operated and continued to make 
decisions which the government ignored or circumvented it faced irrelevance 
and disrespect. There was even the possibility that it could be disbanded if 
powerful politicians became irritated by the MK and its decisions. 
After the heady initial muscle-flexing in Electricity Law case, the MK, quite 
necessarily, adopted several ‘tempering techniques.’ These methods could 
soften negative effects of its decisions on other arms of government, but they 
might arguably require the MK to diverge from the letter of the law. 
It has adopted at least four tempering techniques. In so doing, it has drawn 
on strategies employed by constitutional courts in continental Europe and 
Tempering techniques
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elsewhere that are also caught between enforcing the constitution and 
political reality. 
Technique 1. The MK has declared that its decisions operate only into 
the future. In other words, even if it finds that a law is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, the law will be invalid only from the date the it hands down 
its decision invalidating the law. Anything done under the law before the 
MK invalidated the law remains legal and does not need be to ‘undone’.
This self-imposed limitation was brought into stark relief in the aftermath 
of a Constitutional Court case involving some of those involved in the 
Bali bombings in Kuta in 2002. The Court had, by bare majority, decided 
that one of the laws under which the Bali bombers were convicted was 
unconstitutional because it was enacted after the bombings took place. The 
law was retroactive in effect, and the Constitution prohibits retroactive 
laws. The decision could not, however, be used to undo the action taken 
under the law that the MK held was unconstitutional. In other words, 
the Bali bombers did not need to be set free or retried. Because they had 
been convicted under the law before the MK had invalidated the law, their 
convictions stood. 
Two further cases illustrate some of the ramifications of this technique. 
In one case, three Australians convicted and sentenced to death for 
attempting to smuggle heroin out of Indonesia asked the MK to consider 
whether imposing the death penalty in narcotics cases contradicted 
the Constitution’s right to life. In another, some of the Bali bombers 
approached the MK, asking it to assess whether the way the death penalty 
is carried out in Indonesia – by firing squad – was cruel and inhumane 
punishment, prohibited by the Constitution. 
The MK turned down both requests. Even if it had agreed with the Bali 
9 and declared the death penalty unconstitutional, the executions would 
probably have gone ahead because the death penalty had already been 
imposed under the law. By contrast, if the Bali bombers had succeeded in 
their second case, they might have been able to avoid the death penalty, at 
least by firing squad, because the law under which they were to be executed 
had not yet been applied to them – that is, they had not yet been executed. 
Technique 2. In several cases, the MK has declared that a law is not consistent 
with the Constitution but, because the consequences of invalidating the law 
would be too great, has refused to strike down the law, preferring instead to 
ask the government to make further attempts at compliance. 
A series of cases in which it was asked to review the national state budget 
provide instructive examples of the use of this technique. The Indonesian 
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Constitution requires that the national parliament allocate at least 20% of 
the state budget to education. The Indonesian Teacher’s Association, and 
others, asked the MK, in cases filed almost annually from 2004, to invalidate 
state budgets that have failed to meet this target. 
These cases are about as straightforward as legal cases can be: the 
constitutional target appears clear; the budget does not meet the target; 
therefore, the budget does not comply with the Constitution. Realising, 
however, that budgets are hotly political and usually delicately balanced, the 
MK, each year, has declined to invalidate it, citing the likelihood of ensuing 
financial chaos. Instead, it has urged the government to increase the budget 
allocation for education from year to year.  
Technique 3. Using this strategy, the MK has decided that a law breaches 
the Constitution but refuses to strike it off the books immediately, 
choosing instead to set a deadline for the national parliament to pass a new, 
constitutional, law. 
This approach was adopted in the Anti-Corruption Court case of 2006, in 
which the MK decided that the law which established the Anti-Corruption 
Court was unconstitutional. But, admitting that the Anti-Corruption 
Court was making significant dents in corruption levels in Indonesia 
and realising that it would be shut down if the law was invalidated with 
immediate effect, the MK gave parliament until 19 December 2009. At 
time of writing, however, it was unclear whether the DPR would meet this 
deadline. 
Technique 4. In several decisions, the MK has decided that a law is 
‘conditionally constitutional’ – that is that it is constitutional and can stay 
‘on the books’ provided that it is implemented in a way which it thinks is 
constitutional. 
This technique was adopted in a recent Constitutional Court judgement, 
issued on 7 August 2009, after the MK was asked to pass judgement on 
the method the Electoral Commission (KPU) used to allocate seats from 
the 2009 election. Under Indonesia’s electoral laws, the number of votes 
required for each parliamentary seat  is determined by dividing the number 
of registered voters in a particular electoral district by the number of seats 
in that district.  Once a party’s votes meet the quota, it obtains a seat. Of 
course, not all seats can be filled in this first phase: some parties will not 
receive enough votes to obtain a seat; others obtain seats, but their ‘left over’ 
votes are insufficient to obtain a further seat. Known as “remainders”, these 
votes and seats need to be allocated in some way. Different countries use 
different methods to do this. 
Ruling on the election
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The method of allocating the surplus seats and votes to parties under 
Indonesian electoral law (10/2008) is very complicated and open to wide 
interpretation, as has been discussed in the Report of 31 August, 2009. The 
KPU issued an internal regulation which applied an interpretation that 
attempted to apply the surplus more or less proportionally.
But several Democratic Party members who missed out on a seat under this 
allocation method decided to challenge the KPU Regulation. Since this 
was a regulation and not a law it was outside the jurisdiction of the MK and 
was taken instead to the Supreme Court which has the power to rule on 
regulations issued by government agencies.
The Supreme Court ruled that the KPU Regulation had not complied with 
the electoral law. According to the MA’s interpretation, votes for the major 
parties would, in effect, be counted twice: once to determine whether they 
had met the quota for a seat in the first phase, and again, to determine how 
many of the ‘remainder’ seats they would obtain.
The significance of the Supreme Court’s decision was clear: 66 seats 
would need to be reallocated in the DPR, and around 1,300 in regional 
parliaments. Major parties were the clear winners, with SBY’s Democratic 
Party gaining an additional 31 seats, and PDI-P and Golkar gaining 
between 16 to 19 seats each. 
Small parties, such the United Development Party (PPP) and Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS), Gerindra and Hanura would all lose seats. These parties 
therefore mounted a case with the Constitutional Court, asking that it 
reverse the effect of the Supreme Court judgement. A preliminary matter 
was whether the Constitutional Court could, in fact, hear the case at all. The 
MK lacks power to either review Supreme Court decisions or to determine 
whether a KPU Regulation is consistent with law. In its judgement, the 
Constitutional Court admitted these limitations and, instead, focussed on 
whether the Election Law, which the disputed KPU regulation had sought 
to implement, itself complied with the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court found that the provisions of the law were so 
unclear that they violated the Constitution’s guarantee of ‘legal certainty.’ 
Instead of invalidating the provisions, however, the MK held them to be 
‘conditionally constitutional’ – that is, valid, provided that they are applied 
in line with the MK’s own interpretation of them. And this interpretation 
effectively supported the KPU Regulation that the Supreme Court had 
struck down. Without explicitly saying so, the Constitutional Court 
overthrew the decision of the Supreme Court and returned the seat count in 
parliament to the status quo.
Van Zorge Report      September 17, 2009 
18
It seems reasonable to speculate that MK’s longevity thus far can be 
attributed, at least in part, to its flexible approach to legal principle and 
interpretation, as reflected in these techniques, thereby minimising political 
resistance to its function is existence. Other new institutions established 
to embark upon legal reforms have not treaded so carefully, prompting a 
political backlash strong enough to threaten their efficacy – in some cases, 
even their very existence. 
The Judicial Commission, for instance, was initially established to investigate 
judicial (mis)conduct and to propose appointments to the Supreme Court. 
Within only a few years of its establishment, the Commission was hobbled 
after it publicly targeted previously ‘untouchable’ senior members of the 
Supreme Court in its investigations. The Court responded fiercely, asking the 
Constitutional Court to prohibit the Judicial Commission from investigating 
judges on the basis that such scrutiny might affect the independence of judges 
when deciding cases. The Constitutional Court agreed, in effect prohibiting 
the Judicial Commission from examining the decisions of any Indonesian 
judge. This left the Commission with the sole and rather toothless function 
of proposing names of judges to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court – advice 
which the Supreme Court almost routinely ignores.
The Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) and the Anti-Corruption Court, 
also, have perhaps performed too well. Although both institutions began 
slowly, they incrementally built up an extraordinary track record of success 
in their investigations, prosecutions and convictions in their corruption 
cases, albeit involving lower-ranked public officials, including provincial 
governors. In so doing, they faced little overt political resistance. 
From this base, the KPK began targeting more senior and prominent 
officials – even national parliamentarians and a relative of President SBY. 
Pursuing big fish is clearly necessary if Indonesia is to reduce its very 
high corruption levels, but the KPK’s timing lacked political nous. The 
move provoked senior politicians to launch a full-blown attack on both 
institutions and the legislation on the Anti-Corruption Court currently 
being debated in the parliament may greatly reduce the Court’s effectiveness. 
Although the tempering techniques used by the Constitutional Court 
are arguably necessary for the MK’s survival, they may themselves be 
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal, raising significant questions about 
the MK and its role. The Constitution requires the MK to ensure that the 
DPR follows the Constitution. When it fails to do so, but the MK chooses 
not to intervene, it is failing to perform this task. The MK is allowing laws 
to continue in force which, the MK has determined, are beyond the DPR’s 
lawmaking power.  
Implications of tempering techniques
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There are concerns about the MK’s decision to give only prospective effect 
to its decisions. If an applicant cannot use a favourable MK decision 
to force the government to undo action that it took on the basis of an 
unconstitutional law, there seems little to be gained in approaching it. Only 
people to whom the unconstitutional law were to be applied in the future 
gain from the MK’s ruling, not the applicant that launched the case.  
Meanwhile, the government can pass a law which contains the most 
egregious breach of human rights and apply it with impunity until someone 
asks the MK to strike it down. Even if it eventually does strike it down, any 
action taken under the law before it was struck down will be considered 
‘legal’. As mentioned, the MK made a general exception to this stance in the 
vote allocation case. But this is problematic in itself; the MK did not justify 
why it made the exception and gave no guidelines as to the circumstances in 
which the exception might be applied in the future.
The decision on the Electoral Law is also problematic in a number of ways. 
The first is that, as mentioned, the MK lacks power to review Supreme 
Court and KPU decisions, yet it managed to deprive a Supreme Court 
decision of legal effect. It did this by arguing that the law had caused legal 
uncertainty (as evidenced by the diverging interpretations of the KPU and 
Supreme Court) which is prohibited under the Constitution. Yet surely this 
is stretching the concept of legal uncertainty which, if taken to its logical 
conclusion, could be used as a ground to invalidate almost any Indonesian 
statute. 
In addition, noting that its past practice had been to give only prospective 
operation to its decisions, the MK decided that an exception was justified 
in this case because correct ‘democratic’ seat allocation in national elections 
was of particular importance. The decision smacks of ‘legal norm shopping’ 
– finding a legal argument, albeit weak, to support the desired decision, in 
this case to circumvent limitations on its jurisdiction and to diverge from its 
usual practices. 
Perhaps though, criticisms such as these should be reserved for 
constitutional courts which, although operating in political systems in 
which judicial review and accountability mechanisms are well accepted, 
persist with similar tempering techniques. It may be unfair to judge the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court using standards developed in countries 
which have more compliant and respectful governments, and where political 
considerations are not so overwhelming. 
Because the MK has shown many enduring signs of promise, expectations 
of what it can achieve in Indonesia’s political environment are simply 
unreasonably high. It seems that to have any chance of making the 
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government follow the letter of the Constitution in the future, the MK 
must itself deviate from the Constitution, at least for now. 
It cannot decide its cases in a vacuum, devoid of their political contexts and 
ramifications. If the MK always strictly applied the letter of the law in its 
cases, then it even might not have thrived or even survived thus far.
We also should not forget the MK’s significant successes. Firstly, without 
using tempering techniques, it has struck down provisions of several 
problematic statutes which it declared were not consistent with Indonesia’s 
world-class bill of rights. These include laws which damaged freedom of 
expression and discriminated on the basis of political persuasion. 
Second, some of its ‘tempered’ decisions have, it seemed eventually 
prompted a government response. For instance, largely due to annual 
prodding by the MK, the DPR, eventually, allocated 20% of the state 
budget to education from 2009. 
Third, by all accounts, decisions of the MK are forcing some DPR members 
to at least flick through the Constitution before they sign off on laws; and 
they are said to be making legislators more careful about what they attempt 
in DPR and say in DPR debates, lest the MK ask for a transcript of the 
debates and reveal it at trial for all to see. 
Finally, the MK provides a very public forum in which legal issues are 
openly explored and grievances between citizens and the government can 
be fully aired, if not always satisfactorily resolved. It’s apparent legal norm 
shopping and flexibility does not seem to deter citizens, organisations and 
institutions from using it – they still flock to it to put their cases. Perhaps 
the MKt’s provision of this forum – in which the government is held to 
account to citizens for the laws it makes –is its greatest achievement thus far. 
It remains to be seen, though, whether the MK will build for itself authority 
built on reputation and popular support from which it can compel the 
government and the DPR to comply with its decisions. p
Successes 
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vote, siphoning off votes that would have gone to Bakrie 
and thereby allowing Surya Paloh to win.
More important than the question of whether Golkar 
will be in the government or in the opposition is the 
ability of the chairman of Golkar to provide party 
leadership. He has to cultivate a new generation of 
leaders and a new image of the party as well. The problem 
inside Golkar is that there is a culture of vote-buying: as 
long as that culture is maintained, only entrepreneurs, 
businessmen, or those who are rich can take over the 
chairmanship.
VZR:  There are reports that the House of Representatives 
is looking to strip wiretapping authority of the Anti 
Corruption Commission (KPK) and place its prosecutorial 
authority under the Attorney General’s Office. Is this a 
systematic attack?
We can interpret the phenomenon of the weakening 
of KPK from two perspectives. First, there have been 
tensions between KPK and 
other institutions, such as 
the National Police, over 
overlapping jurisdictions. 
Second, the problem is related 
to the perception of personal 
threats felt by politicians. 
There is an ongoing systematic 
move to weaken the KPK 
VZR:  Where is President 
Yudhoyono? Why hasn’t he 
spoken out?
SBY will not make statements critical of particular 
institutions. It is not his style to take the side of 
one institution over another, in this case either 
the Police or the KPK. He prefers to make broad 
normative statements, like those affirming his political 
commitment to deal with corruption. He does not want 
to create conflict by issuing statements that could be 
misinterpreted.
It is, however, clear from his previous statement that he 
believes the KPK should not have unlimited powers. 
Bima Arya Sugiarto is Executive Director of Charta 
Politika Indonensia. The scholar, analyst, and consultant 
received his PhD from Australian National University 
and was a moderator on MetroTV’s program Democrazy. 
The Report said down with Bima to get his take on the 
top issues of the day: from relations with Malaysia, to the 
KPK, and the possible resurrection of Tommy Suharto.
Van Zorge Report:  Tommy Suharto officially announced 
his candidacy for Golkar chairman on 9 September.  What 
are the implications of the race for the office and the Golkar 
chairmanship?
The most important 
issue facing Golkar is the 
direction of the party after 
the chairmanship election. 
Bakrie would lead Golkar 
to SBY [Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono]; Paloh would 
lead Golkar in another 
direction. For Golkar 
activists at the regional level, 
it is important for them to 
know which candidate will 
provide more benefits, not 
just with strong political connections, but also in 
term of income, business, opportunities, etc. This is 
an old habit of Golkar. It is difficult for Paloh to get 
political support since he hopes to take Golkar into the 
opposition.
As for Tommy, there are two common interpretations for 
his entering the race.  The first is that Yuddy Chrisnandi 
[also vying for the chairman position] invited Tommy 
to do so with the idea that with Tommy as chair, Yuddy 
might then be chosen as Secretary General.  The other 
possibility is that Tommy joined in order to split the 
“There is a culture of 
vote-buying in Golkar 
. . . only entrepreneurs, 
businessmen, or those 
who are rich, can take 
over the chairmanship.”
Expert Interview: 
Bima Arya Sugiarto
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Now, with Boediono, a professional as vice 
president, SBY should be able to accommodate more 
professionals in his cabinet, and overall, his cabinet 
will be composed based on three factors: competency, 
representation (diverse backgrounds in terms of parties, 
demographics, and geography) 
and his own promise that he 
will recruit young leaders for 
his cabinet.
VZR :  Aceh’s  provincial 
legislature is scheduled to 
pass a new and stricter form 
of Shariah, one that calls for caning and stoning as 
punishment for ‘moral crimes,’ like consuming alcohol or 
committing adultery.  Are we likely to see similar laws in 
the future?
I have visited Aceh several times and believe that 
the Islamic influence there 
is weakening, especially 
compared to the initial era of 
autonomy.  There are other 
forces competing for influence 
like capitalism.  My concern 
about Aceh now is not with 
the implementation of Sharia, 
but how the Acehnese people 
are dealing with the exodus of 
aid and development workers. Without the funding 
and expertise from abroad, can the Acehnese people 
manage Aceh? 
Acehnese are distrustful of outsiders and there is 
political fragmentation within Aceh. An important 
part of this is the government’s cooptation of former 
GAM [Free Aceh Movement] activists. We see that ex-
Acehnese militias members have become entrepreneurs 
and government officials. 
Post reconstruction, Aceh needs to be more open. 
They need to attract investors both from Indonesia and 
internationally.
VZR:  Will there be political fallout from the Bank 
Century case?
Perhaps he sees this as a check on the KPK’s powers.
VZR:  Do you think the new House of Representatives 
[DPR] will be more successful than its predecessor?
In 1999, PDI-P won the 
majority of votes but it failed 
to gain any momentum in 
political contests. The problem 
was that most of the members 
had low levels of education. 
Now, the Democrat Party has 
the majority in the DPR and 
I have observed something interesting. The percentage 
of legislators with high levels of education has risen 
dramatically [in all parties].
I also see a declining number of legislators who are party 
activists.  Increasingly, entrepreneurs are overtaking 
the activists. Take PAN 
[National Mandate Party], for 
example. In the 1999- 2004 
DPR, most members of PAN 
were intellectuals and party 
activists, but now they are 
mostly entrepreneurs.
There are two sides to this 
increase in entrepreneurs. 
On the one hand, they will be better at responding to 
and communicating with their constituency.  On the 
other hand, there is potential for conflicts of interest. 
Members may seek legislation that would benefit their 
companies. 
VZR: Will SBY choose a good cabinet?
SBY has begun to demonstrate the courage to act more 
like a president ‘in a presidential system.’ We saw this 
in his choice of Boediono as his vice president.  This 
shows that SBY learned from his past experience 
when he had to deal with political parties. He realized 
especially as the election drew closer that it was not 
good to have too many party interests. At the time, he 
had to accommodate a lot of politicians in his cabinet. It 
became unpredictable. 
“SBY prefers to make 
broad, normative 
statements.”
“We are looking for 
something that can 
unite us.”
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In case of Bank Century, in the public view, someone 
will need to be held responsible. That’s what the public 
want to see, a legal process. 
There is a growing opinion that SBY could be the 
next target after Sri Mulyani and Boediono, two 
officials responsible for monetary and financial affairs. 
Boediono and Sri Mulyani need to explain to the 
public what happened.  They can provide data and 
present the argument the bailout 
was necessary to prevent further 
problems.
VZR:  Have they done that so far?
Well, it’s just a matter of public 
relations. The issue is becoming 
increasingly politicized; it is not 
really an economic issue at all.
VZR: Do you see any parallels between the Bank Century 
case and the Bank Bali case?
 Yes, but I don’t think it will bring about the downfall 
of SBY. We have direct presidential election now, which 
require a lot of money. It is very expensive. That’s the 
way the public’s logic works.
VZR: What to you make of the move to reactivate the 
Indonesian military’s anti-terror desk and to have the 
military take a larger role in counterterrorism?
I don’t think it’s a very relevant policy. To begin with, 
I think what they need to do is to form one solid 
professional institution, a kind of task force to deal 
with terrorism. Currently, it’s under the Coordinating 
Ministry of Political and Security Affairs, and there’s 
the DPT (Anti Terror Desk). But an anti-terror 
agency shouldn’t be subordinate. It needs to be an 
independent institution with the power and authority 
to fight terrorism. 
VZR: There has been some preliminary findings released 
by the World Bank that suggest that perhaps several 
thousand extra judicial killings happen each year in 
Indonesia. How would you characterize the rule of law?
If we are looking at the broader level, the national level, 
in terms of fighting corruption, you can see progress. 
But if you see the daily lives, people remain suspect of 
the police and the judiciary.  They do not believe that 
they will be treated fairly. They will have to pay bribes. 
Certainly, limited budget provided by the government 
to the legal institutions is another problem.
Until there are enough instances of  justice done through 
the law, they will continue to 
choose vigilante justice. 
VZR: How should we interpret 
the current spat between some in 
Indonesia and Malaysia?  What 
is this actually about? 
I think we are looking for 
something that can unite us. 
The concept of common enemy, to some extent, is 
relevant. If we believe that a neighboring country has 
stolen from us, we have a sense that we are united. 
There has been an interesting change in the direction 
of discussion. There is a good essay written by a noted 
Indonesian writer, Remy Silado, which says that many 
Indonesians are also committing a kind of plagiarism, 
songs that are actually Malay, for example. So we should 
not overreact to the accusation that Malaysia was using 
part of our culture for their tourist promotions.
VZR:  Federal Police in Australia are reopening the case of 
the Balibo 5.  Will this strain relations between Indonesia 
and Australia?
I have been studying the relationship between Australia 
and Indonesia for years. The Indonesian-Australian 
relationship is a love-hate relationship:  a rollercoaster. 
Often it just comes down to a war between the media 
here and there, and the political elites.  Often also you 
see the opposition in Australia using Indonesian issues 
to attack the Australian government. 
But for many reasons, I don’t believe this issue will 
become very serious.  First, it is an old case which will 
make it difficult for the public to become attached to 
“The Indonesian-
Australian 
relationship is a love-
hate relationship.”
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the idea.  We would see a bigger problem if someone in 
Australia criticized our current leaders.  That would be 
a problem.
As the president of Indonesia, SBY has to show strong 
authority. The government should explain whether the 
case of murder of the Australian journalists (Balibo case) 
has been dealt with properly by the legal authorities. 
The government should also develop productive 
agreements with the relevant institutions in Australia to 
handle the case properly. Each country’s foreign affairs 
ministries should be more active in developing common 
understanding in relation to the case. p
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